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ANDEAN 
PROPOSALS
From the start of the 1990s, the issue of 
Environmental Services has att racted the att enti on of 
conservati onists, development organizati ons and donors, 
who have been interested in seeking and supporti ng new 
strategies for fi nancing conservati on and, additi onally, 
in some cases, for diversifying the income of rural 
communiti es.
By the logic of the market, the principal proposal is the 
Payment for Ecosystem Services: “a voluntary transacti on 
for an environmental service, in which at least one buyer 
and one seller parti cipate; the environmental service is 
well-defi ned; and the provider of the service ensures its 
provision”.
Given that water in the Andes is such an important 
resource, closely related with the management of 
ecosystems and important for the wellbeing of dozens 
of millions of people, we can assume that there exists a 
large market for the Payment of Hydrological Ecosystem 
Services (PHES).
However, the PHES schemes that unti l now have been 
implemented in the Andes, are not the result of market 
forces, defi ned as a group of voluntary transacti ons 
sti mulated by the interacti on of demand and supply, but 
of negoti ati on and cooperati on among diff erent actors.
But is the market really the answer? 
Research made by CONDESAN between 2008 and 2011 
indicates that the existi ng cases in the Andes functi on in 
the absence of a market. Based on this research, we can 
also state that the mechanisms rooted in the market are 
less likely to include the requirements of equity and the 
fi ght against poverty.
Water management, which is so important for society in 
general and is considered a human right in the majority 
of countries in the region, should include strong social 
and cultural provisions that go beyond the market.
Some concerns regarding PHES
In recent years (2008-2011) CONDESAN has promoted 
spaces for research and discussion regarding benefi t 
sharing mechanisms in the Andes. 
As part of these discussions, as far as Payments for 
Hydrological Ecosystem Services are concerned, 
some points of discussion have stood out, which 
will conti nue to be important in the coming years 
in line with the progress this scheme makes.
1. WHY TO PAY?
The resource itself (water) is not what is paid for, but 
rather the acti vity that helps to improve hydrological 
regulati on (conservati on, reforestati on, vegetati on 
recovery, bett er agricultural practi ces). 
Therefore, if the payment is made only when a suffi  cient 
quanti ty of good quality water is delivered without 
interrupti on, it may be ineffi  cient because much ti me 
may pass before this occurs.
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2. WHO RECEIVES THE PAYMENT?
There are three principal considerati ons in selecti ng the 
possible benefi ciaries of PHES: The value chain, land 
tenure, and the informal and illegal use of resources. 
To ensure the provision of EHS, there is a verti cal 
distributi on of opportunity costs; if an area of forest is 
converted, for example, to agricultural producti on, not 
just does the farmer have a potenti al income but also the 
intermediaries, transport providers, dairy companies, 
local government, etc. 
Therefore, who has the most to lose from conservati on? 
Should each be compensated? The second issue revolves 
around land users without formal ti tle. Can or should 
they parti cipate in PHES?
Finding ways to overcome this complex set of problems 
regarding land ownership is parti cularly important to 
ensure the effi  ciency of PHES. 
A third issue regards illegal or informal users. In many 
countries, the legislati on regarding the use of resources 
is weak and someti mes not applicable or poorly enforced 
(paper parks, forest reserves that produce charcoal or 
where hunti ng of certain species is common). 
Therefore, many natural resources are used in a way 
that is informal but not necessarily illegal. Should these 
people be compensated too? There is no single answer 
but we need to have a pragmati c soluti on to these cases.
3. HOW TO PAY PFOR A SERVICE THAT IS OFTEN 
INTANGIBLE?
One of the recurring problems with PHES schemes 
are the gaps in knowledge and research. No tangible 
product exists (such as a good that is delivered directly 
on payment) but rather a service that is conserved or 
improved through various acti ons without it really being 
known how much this is att ributable to those acti ons.
Few studies of applied environmental valuati on have 
managed to defi ne the intrinsic value of a service or the 
opportunity cost to the land owner. The fi nal values paid 
are the result of negoti ati ons, and very few are based on 
valuati ons of the environmental service.
4. ADDITIONALITY, BASELINES AND 
MONITORING
Measuring the additi onality of forest management and 
forestati on projects and of good agricultural practi ces on 
hydrological regulati on, establishing a clear baseline and 
standardized tools for evaluati on, ensuring that providers 
comply with the incenti vized acti vity and produce the 
environmental service, are some of the challenges 
related to PHES. 
In the Andean nati ons, the lack of legal instruments, 
control and enforcement, demands a system of periodic 
monitoring and compliance.
5. HOW TO PAY?
Payments in cash are what rural communiti es generally 
need to improve their wellbeing and the mechanism 
of direct payments to owners, in exchange for the 
conservati on of their land, is the most common. 
Nevertheless, ﬂ ows of cash can also cause problemati c 
social eff ects, greater inequality and the use of those 
funds for other acti viti es that are not compati ble with 
the provision of HES.
But direct payment is just one of various mechanisms 
that are used. Others include educati on, security, soft  
credits and the purchase of land. 
Each of these has its advantages and diffi  culti es, 
depending on the local reality and the desire of the 
community. 
The fact that this variety of mechanisms exists to reward 
the providers of HES has lead to various att empts to use 
the term “compensati on” rather than “payment”.
6. EQUITY VS. EFFICIENCY?
Among conservati on and rural development 
organizati ons, many people consider PHES as a source 
of fair compensati on for rural populati ons of limited 
resources who care for the environment and thus provide 
HES, unti l now for free. However, from the viewpoint of 
effi  ciency, only those that consti tute a real threat to the 
environmental service should be paid. 
Thus, there exists the danger of creati ng a perverse 
incenti ve in which the “environmental criminal” receives 
compensati on but the “saint” who poses no threat 
remains unpaid. 
Likewise, this can occur with large scale providers (such 
as the owners of large areas of forest, with a signifi cant 
quanti ty of potenti ally marketable hydrological services) 
as they tend to be more effi  cient in delivering the service 
than small scale providers. This is a questi on that PHES 
schemes should address, seeking a balance between the 
goals of effi  ciency and considerati ons of equity.
7. CAN PHES HELP TO REDUCE POVERTY?
Of the cases currently operati ve, we can conclude 
that in general the net eff ects for the providers of 
environmental services are positi ve. 
However, some rules regarding access and structural 
limitati ons in PHES schemes limit the parti cipati on of 
the poorest (people without formal land ti tles, litt le 
land, people who due to economic limitati ons do not 
pose a threat to the ecosystem service, etc.). 
Reducing poverty is an important objecti ve associated 
with PHES, strongly related to the principle of equity. 
However, if it is converted into the main objecti ve, it 
threatens the basic functi onality of PHES, related to the 
principle of eff ecti veness.
8. ETHICAL DOUBTS ABOUT PHES
There exists a growing percepti on among various 
groups in Andean countries that PES is not a very 
ethical mechanism, because it places a fundamental 
human right, such as access to and use of water, within 
a market mechanism, which changes the relati onships of 
control and power regarding this resource.
Recommendations for the design of 
beneﬁ t sharing mechanisms beyond the 
market
The few cases of PHES currently implemented in the 
Andes confi rm that the market for ecosystem services 
is not yet consolidated, because the determinati on of a 
price for the service is what complicates the development 
of the market as such. 
There exists a set of transacti ons that take place among 
users and providers of the environmental service in 
a voluntary manner, with diff erent procedures for 
negoti ati on and agreement among the parti es. In this, 
the valuati on of the price through fi nancial instruments 
is just one part, as other variables, such as the cultural, 
social and ecological context, also play a role.
It is thought that a public policy regarding the market 
should not center on the “market” per se, nor on the 
Challenges for PHES
Diff erent studies have evaluated the lessons learned from specifi c cases of payments for environmental services in 
Lati n America. Platf orms to compare and exchange experiences at a global level are Ecosystem Marketplace and the 
Katoomba Group. For its part, CONDESAN is an organizati on that promotes the systemizati on and analysis of experiences 
at the Andean regional level, through the Andean Panorama project for Hydrological Environmental Services (2008-
2010). 
In the diff erent spaces of analysis of experiences that Ecosystem Marketplace, the Katoomba Group and more 
regionally, CONDESAN have promoted, the conclusion has been that all cases currently functi oning were initi ated on 
an experimental basis, having a diversity of sources of fi nancing and management models, and on many occasions 
accompanied by long processes of communicati on and raising of awareness, and that the majority of these should not 
be considered PHES schemes.
It happens that the cases analyzed are not simply a transacti on between a provider and a benefi ciary, but rather 
a process of interacti on on the long term and a conti nuous, adapti ve management in which the market does not 
intervene. These cases together span a total area of hydrological interest of more than 800,000 hectares, of which 
nearly 25% is directly managed through conservati on agreements, land purchases, bett er producti ve practi ces or 
security for protected areas that benefi ts more than three million people.
The few cases in the Andes that can be considered PHES schemes are focused on sti mulati ng acti viti es that protect 
natural ecosystems and that recover vegetati on cover (natural regenerati on or reforestati on). Just a few contemplate 
the sti mulati on of bett er producti ve practi ces or the recovery of degraded lands. 
These schemes are fi nanced by multi ple sources; the major source of fi nancing comes from the benefi ciaries, whether 
they are individual users of water or government representati ves. Important additi onal funds have been provided by 
NGOs and internati onal aid agencies. There are various insti tuti onal structures for these schemes, both public and 
private, and they are characterized by being ﬂ exible and holisti c.
“payment for hydrological ecosystem services” but on 
broadening the definition towards “economic tools” and 
“benefit sharing mechanisms”, which take into account 
the relationship between the population and water, 
whose valuation depends on multiple factors.
The instruments that should be promoted should aim 
to redistribute the benefits and the way in which they 
operate is similar to that of a market. 
The range of economic instruments is broader than 
the market and recognizes the different processes of 
negotiation and agreement. The instrument should 
permit payment in kind and not just in cash.
The policies for recognizing those who take care of water, 
regardless of the existence of a market or not, should 
be about rewards and awareness more than regulation, 
placing the issue on the national agenda. 
There is a certain level of controversy regarding the issue 
of HES and in this context it is useful to have documents 
and tools to help orient us.
Compensation for environmental services (regardless of 
the market or form of compensation) is an instrument 
that recognizes someone who is doing good regarding 
the management of an ecosystem, but always starting 
from the premise that natural resources are the property 
of the state.
This automatically requires a minimum legal framework 
to define what is being managed and who are the 
beneficiaries in order to promote efficiency and equity 
at the same time. On the other hand, many cases have 
occurred without any regulation and it appears necessary 
in the cases of private actors. 
However, the case of water is always of public interest 
and this, along with the roles and responsibilities of 
different actors and institutions, must be protected in 
such an uncertain context.
It is important to seek coherence in environmental, 
economic and social policies, especially regarding how 
to ensure social equity while working on the issue of 
ecosystem conservation given that if a policy does 
not promote equity it will not be sustainable. In this 
discussion, the issue of property also plays a role. 
Experiences with PHES include the risk of creating greater 
inequity because in theory they are more successful 
when they compensate those who have most property 
(and who produce most environmental services).
On the other hand, groups with less property and without 
clear land title have greater barriers to participate in 
PHES systems. This is the dilemma between equity and 
efficiency. The regulatory framework, therefore, should 
be oriented towards the definition of property rights and 
land title; strengthening the capacity to negotiate and 
obtain agreements under equal conditions, based on 
symmetrical information and transparent processes.
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Links
• Initiative for Hydrological Monitoring of Andean 
Ecosystems (MHEA) https://sites.google.com/site/
iniciativaregionalmhea
• Challenge Program on Water & Food (CPWF)www.
waterandfood.org
• Katoomba group 
      www.ecosystemmarketplace.org
• CONDESAN • www.condesan.org
• InfoAndina • www.infoandina.org
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